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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his Comments on Swift and Slobogin: Mental State Evidence,1 Pro-
fessor Paul Rothstein poses some questions about the Article that I 
wrote for this Law Review’s Guilt vs. Guiltiness Symposium.2  I appreci-
ate this opportunity to respond to Professor Rothstein and to con-
tribute to the ongoing dialogue about the Symposium.  This dialogue 
began at a panel presentation to the Evidence Section of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in January 2008.  Surely one indication 
of a successful panel is that it spawned not only the Symposium arti-
cles but also thoughtful commentary, in this case from Professors 
Paul Rothstein and Robert Burns. 
My Symposium Article, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal 
Defendants’ Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay,3 analyzed the past ten 
years of published federal court opinions applying the hearsay excep-
tion for state of mind, Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 803(3).4  I 
identified cases applying a requirement of “timeliness” that is not in-
 ∗ Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.  My thanks 
go to Lindsay Crawford and Kathy Yu for their splendid research assistance. 
 1 Paul Rothstein, Comments on Swift and Slobogin: Mental State Evidence, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1395 (2008). 
 2 Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime 
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008). 
 3 Id. 
 4 FRE 803(3) provides that statements of then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical condition are not excluded by the hearsay rule under the following terms: 
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, 
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive design, 
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health) but not including a statement 
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to . . . declarant’s will. 
FED. R. EDIV. 803(3).  My data set included all cases containing discussion of FRE 
803(3) significant enough to warrant a Westlaw Headnote.  See Swift, supra note 2, at 
993. 
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cluded in the express terms of that Rule.5  The Article focused on 
hearsay statements that expressed a “then existing” or current state of 
mind, as required by FRE 803(3), made by criminal defendants after 
the commission of the crime with which they were charged.  Defen-
dants offered these statements as exculpatory evidence to show their 
current “innocent” state of mind and to generate an inference that 
they had held the same mental state, lacking criminal intent, at the 
time of the alleged crime. 
These statements fit within the express terms of FRE 803(3) and 
would have been admitted into evidence were it not for the “timeli-
ness” requirement that courts have injected into the exception.  The 
“timeliness” test requires that there be no lapse of time between the 
alleged crime and the making of the hearsay statement.6  If there is 
such a time lapse, courts adopting the test assume that there is time 
for the defendant to reflect and to fabricate the “innocent” state of 
mind statement.  Thus, they require contemporaneity of crime and 
statement in order to “negate the likelihood of deliberate or con-
scious misrepresentation.”7  Since post-crime statements by definition 
suffer from some lapse of time, they are excluded. 
However, Rule 803(3)’s express terms require contemporaneity 
only between the declarant’s then existing state of mind and his 
statement.  The Symposium Article argued against the court-imposed 
additional requirement of timeliness based on the policy underlying 
the FRE’s categorical hearsay exceptions, pursuant to which satisfying 
the express terms of the exception “is enough.”8  The Symposium Ar-
ticle further argued against the resulting impoverishment of criminal 
defendants’ ability to prove their own “not guiltiness” under the “nar-
rative theory” of jury decision making, which was the particular sub-
ject of the panel and Symposium.9
In his Comments, Professor Rothstein seems to agree that exclud-
ing defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay under the court-
imposed timeliness test is undesirable.10  He also agrees that narrative 
theory supports broader admissibility of defendants’ state of mind 
hearsay in order to permit the criminal defendant “to tell a richer 
 5 The case law research results are reported in Swift, supra note 2, at 994–97. 
 6 For an in depth discussion of the “timeliness” test see id. at 990–93. 
 7 United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 8 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:71, 
at 613 (3d ed. 2007); see also Swift, supra note 2, at 976–78. 
 9 Swift, supra note 2, at 983–90, 997–99. 
 10 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1403–04 (“I am in total agreement with Professor 
Swift that it would be better policy if juries got to hear the statement and decide for 
themselves whether it is credible and what it means in terms of the overall story.”). 
SWIFT (FINAL) 12/1/2008  11:43:43 AM 
2008] FURTHER THOUGHTS 1413 
 
story.”11  His objections are that my Article was limited to discussing 
only FRE 803(3) and the timeliness test’s impact on criminal defen-
dants, and that it did not consider whether other evidence doctrines 
might justify the exclusion of defendants’ statements on grounds ac-
tually unstated by the courts.12
II. THE FOCUS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE 
Focusing narrative theory only on FRE 803(3), and the timeli-
ness test only on criminal defendants, was impelled by my approach 
to critiquing evidence law, by the subject of the AALS panel and en-
suing Symposium, and by the federal case law itself. 
A. There Are Different Approaches to Critiquing Evidence Law 
Academic critique of evidence law can proceed from the bottom 
up or from the top down.  I chose to proceed from the bottom up, to 
use narrative theory to critique a specific evidence rule.  I applied the 
theory’s abstract terms—evidentiary richness and narrative integrity,13 
juror selection of the story with the “best fit” to the evidence at trial,14 
and the necessity of competition between “plausible alternative” sto-
ries15—to show how the timeliness test undermines the theory’s goals 
in specific and concrete cases.16
Other commentators, including Professors Robert Burns and 
Ronald Allen, have used narrative theory to show the need for fun-
damental changes in evidence law, such as abolishing all of the prin-
cipal exclusionary rules of evidence in favor of a system of “free 
proof,” or revising the burdens of proof.17  There is value in my ap-
proach as well as theirs.  Significant change in evidence law will be a 
product both of critiquing the old, as my Article did, and charting the 
new.  Professor Rothstein does not suggest otherwise. 
 11 Id. at 1400. 
 12 See id. at 1397, 1403, 1404, 1409.  
 13 See Swift, supra note 2, at 983–86. 
 14 Id. at 986–87. 
 15 Id. at 987–90. 
 16 Id. at 997–99. 
 17 Id. at 989, 1002–03.  More recent work by Professors Burns and Allen further 
develops their views.  See Robert P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues 
in Evidence Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435 (2008); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Al-
len, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 L. & PHIL. 223 (2008). 
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B. The Symposium Focused on Narrative Theory in Criminal Cases 
As to why I concentrated on cases in which state of mind hearsay 
was offered by criminal defendants, the answer is pretty obvious, as 
Professor Rothstein acknowledges.18  Professor Michael Risinger, the 
moderator of the AALS panel, chose the topic of Guilt vs. Guiltiness 
for the panel and Symposium.  All of the panel presentations, and the 
Symposium articles that followed, focused on criminal trials and pri-
marily on criminal defendants. 
Indeed, social psychologists developed narrative theory out of 
their research on jury decision making in criminal trials.19  Academic 
interest in this theory has grown since Justice Souter’s explicit refer-
ences to it in the Old Chief majority opinion, a criminal case.20  That 
opinion approved use of the concepts of “evidentiary richness” and 
“narrative integrity” as components of the probative value of evidence 
offered by the prosecution.  Justice Souter’s comments have been 
taken to signal the possible relaxation of a rule of evidence—
relevancy21—in favor of the prosecution, justified by the prosecution’s 
heavy burden of constructing persuasive narratives that could over-
come the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and the jury’s moral 
inhibitions.22
Professor Risinger’s own scholarship explores the risks that in-
here in such leniency toward the prosecution, and this interest 
sparked his choice of the topic of Guilt vs. Guiltiness.  The Symposium 
authors have asked the next logical question: can and should the 
same concern for narrative theory that motivated Old Chief’s leniency 
toward the prosecution also apply to the criminal defendant’s prof-
 18 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1400 (“Admittedly, the Symposium that Slobogin 
and Swift are writing for is entitled Guilt vs. Guiltiness and obviously is confined to the 
subject of criminal defendants.”). 
 19 See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 
(1983); W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).  It is widely ac-
cepted that the narrative elements of stories mesh well with the essential elements of 
criminal prosecutions.  Juries thus easily construct “stories” to make sense of the evi-
dence presented to them in criminal cases.  See Swift, supra note 2, at 980–82, 988–89. 
 20 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 21 Id. at 187–88.  Professor Rothstein claims that Old Chief did not “relax” any evi-
dence rule.  Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1400 n.16.  But see Richard O. Lempert, Narra-
tive Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 16 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court recognized a sense in 
which evidence can be relevant which does not fit within the Federal Rule's core 
definition of relevant evidence . . . .”). 
 22 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187–88. 
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fers of proof?  This is the question that interested us and that made 
for a coherent and successful panel. 
C. Federal Case Law Focuses the Timeliness Test on Criminal 
Defendants 
The case law itself also determined the focus of my article.  It 
bears repeating that federal courts of appeals originally adopted the 
timeliness test exclusively in cases that excluded criminal defendants’ 
proffers of their post-crime state of mind hearsay.23  Current research 
reveals that this test still seems to pose a problem only for criminal 
defendants, not for the prosecution.  The great majority of published 
federal appellate cases during the past ten years that contain any sig-
nificant discussion of FRE 803(3) are criminal.24  Of these, when the 
timeliness test was applied, it was used only to uphold the exclusion 
of state of mind hearsay offered by criminal defendants.25  In the sin-
gle case in which this test was mentioned in objection to a prosecu-
tor’s proffer of hearsay, the appellate court ducked the timeliness is-
sue and upheld admission of the hearsay statement as within the trial 
court’s discretion.26
 23 See Swift, supra note 2, at 991 n.61. 
 24 For appellate court statistics see id. at 994. 
 25 This one-sided impact of the timeliness test was not a surprise.  My prior re-
search on California law had shown that criminal defendants’ post-crime state of 
mind hearsay was excluded in nineteen published cases out of twenty, pursuant to 
the California trustworthiness test.  See Eleanor Swift, The Problem of “Trustworthiness” 
in the Admission of State of Mind Hearsay Under California and Federal Evidence Law,” 36 
SW. U. L. REV. 619, 627 (2008).  In the California cases, state of mind hearsay offered 
by the prosecution was not excluded despite gaps in time between the alleged trig-
gering events and the making of the statements.  Id. at 626, 637–38 & nn.61–63. 
 26 United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2002).  At issue were hearsay 
notes written by the defendant’s accountant, expressing the accountant’s then exist-
ing concerns about the defendant’s accounting practices.  The notes were offered to 
prove that the accountant held those same concerns on July 10, 1995, when she 
spoke to defendant.  The notes were written “sometime following” July 10.  Despite 
an objection from defendant that the notes were not made contemporaneously with 
the July 10 meeting (thus potentially failing the timeliness test cited by the court in a 
footnote), the court held as follows: 
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the notes.  The notes were admitted to prove [the accountant’s] state 
of mind around the time she confronted [the defendant].  Although 
[the accountant] could not identify the specific date on which she 
wrote the notes, she testified that she authored them when the events 
were still “fresh in her mind.” 
Id. at 523.  The court’s focus on the “freshness” of the accountant’s memory of the 
July 10 meeting shows that the court treated the notes as asserting a past fact.  Such 
an assertion would be flatly inadmissible under FRE 803(3).  See infra Part III.B.  It is 
possible that the court interpreted the statement to be a past recollection recorded 
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In the civil appellate opinions within this data set, the timeliness 
test is not even mentioned.  The data set did include forty-six district 
court opinions in civil cases containing a significant discussion of FRE 
803(3).27  Of these, only three discussed and applied the timeliness 
requirement, framed as the declarant must have “no time to fabri-
cate” or to reflect.28  All three opinions excluded plaintiffs’ proffers of 
state of mind hearsay, two of which were statements made by the in-
dividual plaintiffs themselves. In these two cases, courts perceived a 
risk of insincerity due to the self-interested nature of the plaintiffs’ 
own statements.29
Thus, including civil cases more explicitly in my Symposium Ar-
ticle would not have changed my critique of the timeliness test.  As 
applied, it keeps otherwise admissible hearsay from the jury.  And it 
was first developed, and now is applied most consistently, to exclude a 
very particular type of hearsay offered by criminal defendants.  This 
fact, in and of itself, is disturbing and worthy of comment. 
III. THE TIMELINESS TEST OPINIONS CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS 
“IMPRECISE” APPLICATIONS OF OTHER EVIDENCE DOCTRINES 
Professor Rothstein agrees with me that the timeliness test is bad 
hearsay policy, but he thinks that the courts applying it are not “as le-
gally off-base or unsupported by law” as I claim.30  He suggests that 
these courts may actually be using other doctrines “in an imprecise 
way” to exclude the defendants’ state of mind statements. 31  He refers 
which, under FRE 803(5), does require a “fresh” memory.  In any event, the timeli-
ness test was not applied, despite defendant’s objection.  Had it been, it would have 
queried whether, during the time lapse between July 10 and the writing of the notes, 
the accountant had time to reflect and to fabricate the statement of then existing 
state of mind in her notes.  Clearly she did. 
 27 See Swift, supra note 2, at 996.  Forty of these cases were found through West-
law, six were found through Lexis.  This sizeable number of published civil opinions 
reflects many pre-trial decisions on evidence questions through motions in limine, 
motions for summary judgment, and even motions for class certification.  The most 
common civil suits in this database involve employment discrimination, civil rights, 
and trademark protection. 
 28 See Metro. Enter. Corp. v. United Techs. Int’l, No. 3:03cv1685, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9866, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2006); Hussey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 
02-7099, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15012, at *24–*25 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2005); Thomas v. 
Fred Meyer Jewelry, Inc., No. 02-3090-CO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18204, at *3, *6 (D. 
Or. June 23, 2005). 
 29 Fred Meyer Jewelry, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18204, at *3, *6 (letters and diary of 
deceased grievant in a sexual harassment and discrimination case excluded); Hussey, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15012, at *24–*25 (out of court statements by plaintiff in suit 
against employer under Employee Retirement Income Security Act were excluded). 
 30 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1404. 
 31 Id. at 1405. 
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to two doctrines that exclude statements pursuant to the express ex-
clusionary clause in FRE 803(3) excluding “statements of memory or 
belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed.”  This 
clause, and these two doctrines, are focused on preventing the use of 
the state of mind exception to admit hearsay statements that bear 
significant perception and memory dangers.  Perhaps Professor Roth-
stein’s idea is that judicial use of the timeliness test is “supported by 
law” if what it accomplishes is the exclusion of hearsay that is inad-
missible anyway under the exclusionary clause.  My review of the ma-
jor timeliness test opinions, however, shows that this is not what the 
timeliness test is doing. 
A. The Doctrine Excluding Implied Assertions of a Past State of Mind 
A hearsay declarant’s statement of then existing state of mind 
can be excluded if, by making that statement, the declarant intended 
to make an “implied statement” 32 that he held the same state of mind 
in the past, at the time of the alleged crime.  This implied assertion 
would be a statement of memory or belief, used to prove the remem-
bered past state of mind, and would violate the express exclusionary 
clause in FRE 803(3).  As Professor Rothstein states, the key to the 
exclusion of implied assertions under the FRE is the declarant’s in-
tent to assert.33  In cases involving statements by criminal defendants, 
the burden would be on the prosecution to persuade the judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to FRE 104(a), that by ex-
pressing his then existing state of mind, the criminal defendant in-
tended to assert the implied statement that he had previously held 
the same mental state in the past. 
If courts are using the timeliness test as a clever (or bumbling) 
way to avoid the rigorous intent requirement under the implied as-
sertion doctrine, this “imprecision” should not be condoned.  More-
over, in the appellate cases that I reviewed,34 every opinion that actu-
ally upheld exclusion of a defendant’s statement by applying the 
timeliness test explicitly did so on the basis of sincerity dangers result-
ing from an identified time lapse between the alleged crime (or act 
related to the crime) and the making of the statement.  No findings 
of intent to make an implied assertion of past state of mind, and no 
 32 Id. at 1405. 
 33 Id. at 1405 nn.22–23. 
 34 The opinions I reviewed are those identified in my Symposium Article.  See 
Swift, supra note 2, at 995 n.74.  For my previous research, see Swift, supra note 25, at 
645 n.101.  For additional cases cited in Evidence treatises, see 2 MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 274, at 267 n.8 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006). 
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discussion of perception and memory dangers, were present in these 
opinions.  It therefore cannot be said that the statements in these 
cases would have been inadmissible under the implied assertion doc-
trine, not even if applied “imprecisely.”35
B. The Doctrine Excluding Statements Relevant Only to Prove a Past 
Fact 
Sometimes a statement offered to prove the declarant’s state of 
mind does not fit within FRE 803(3) because it is actually relevant 
only to prove what the declarant remembers and believes about a past 
fact.  Such statements cannot fit within the FRE 803(3) exception be-
cause the jury would use them as statements of memory or belief to 
prove the past fact.  They are inadmissible under the Rule’s explicit 
exclusionary clause.36
In the appellate cases that I reviewed, two opinions relied on this 
doctrine.37  They upheld exclusion of statements that had been of-
fered as statements of defendants’ then existing state of mind but 
which the courts interpreted as actually being statements of memory 
or belief about past events, typically the crime charged.38  While these 
 35 Two other opinions did apply the implied assertion doctrine.  In one, the bur-
den of proving the defendant’s intent to make an implied assertion appears satisfied.  
United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the de-
fendant’s statement “was not the product of a contemporaneous state of mind, but 
was intended rather for use by the jury to infer a state of mind that had occurred  
six months earlier . . . .  [the defendant] was making ‘a statement of memory or be-
lief . . . .’”).  In the second, there was no discussion of the intent issue at all.  United 
States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 1999).  Neither court even purported 
to be applying the timeliness test, although one opinion did mention that test.  The 
holding in each of these two cases was that the defendant’s statement was excluded 
as an implied assertion of a past fact by the express exclusionary clause in FRE 
803(3). 
 36 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 
515 (5th ed. 2007).  “If the declarant’s declared state of mind (belief) is relevant only 
because it reflects an external fact of the present or past, which fact itself is the thing 
of significance to the lawsuit, . . . then the state of mind exception is inapplicable.”  
Accord MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, at 605. 
 37 See United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ci-
anci, 378 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 38 See, e.g., Jackson, 780 F.2d at 1315 (defendants’ denials of wrongdoing made two 
years after the alleged crime were offered to prove their own past actions and ex-
cluded as a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered); Cianci, 
378 F.3d at 91 (concluding that the statement, “at least in part, applied to past acts of 
the Cianci administration and were to a large extent ‘self-serving’ attempts to cover 
tracks already made . . .”).  In Jackson, exclusion was also justified under the timeli-
ness test.  780 F.2d at 1315.  In this opinion, therefore, the overlap between the two 
exclusionary doctrines was explicit.  The court was not using the timeliness test to 
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are sometimes difficult interpretations to make,39 the cases show that 
courts do make them. In contrast, courts use the timeliness test to ex-
clude a very different kind of statement—a statement that does ex-
press a then existing state of mind and does not bear perception and 
memory dangers in violation of FRE’s explicit exclusionary clause. 
C. The “Continuity” Theory of Relevance Permits Statements of Then 
Existing State of Mind to Prove the Same State of Mind in the Past 
Without Violating the Exclusionary Clause of FRE 803(3) 
Hearsay statements of a then existing state of mind can be rele-
vant to prove that the declarant held the same state of mind in the 
past.  Relevance is based on an inference that the declarant’s state of 
mind was continuous, extending backwards in time.  This inference 
relies on generalizations about the temporal stability and continuity 
of people’s states of mind.  Relevance is not based on inferences 
about the accuracy of the declarant’s memory and belief about past 
facts—what he once felt, saw, or heard in the past.  Thus, statements 
offered under this backwards “continuity” inference do not bear per-
ception and memory dangers and are not excluded under the ex-
press exclusionary term of FRE 803(3) discussed above. 
This is a crucial distinction throughout hearsay policy.  Com-
mentators and case law approve the “continuity” theory as supporting 
a proper inference from a present state of mind to the existence of 
an identical past state of mind. 40  Reliance on this theory of relevance 
cover up an “imprecise” use of the doctrine excluding statements relevant only to 
prove past facts. 
 39 Some state of mind statements are ambiguous; that is, the statements can be 
read either as expressing a then existing state of mind or as an assertion of a past 
state of mind, or as conduct that would not fit within FRE 803(3).  Some courts then 
apply a “primary purpose” inquiry as noted in MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 274, at 
269 n.8.  If a court finds that the statement is being offered for the “primary pur-
pose” of proving a past fact, then the exclusion decision should be governed by the 
doctrine now being discussed in Part III.B, because the then existing state of mind is 
not itself relevant.  If a court finds that it was declarant’s “primary purpose” in mak-
ing the statement to impliedly assert a past state of mind or past fact, then the exclu-
sion decision should be governed by the intent test discussed infra Part III.A. 
 40 MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 274, at 270–71 (“[T]he evidentiary effect of the 
[then existing state of mind] statement is broadened by the notion of the continuity 
in time of states of mind . . . .  Continuity may also look backwards.”); MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, at 605 (“[I]t is plausible to admit [a] statement not 
only to prove [state of mind] at the moment of speaking, but to permit backward-
looking inferences that [the speaker] probably has similar [mental state] a week ear-
lier, or a month earlier, or perhaps even years earlier.”).  Professor Rothstein men-
tions this issue of backwards continuity in his Evidence Nutshell in the form of a ques-
tion that the authors do not answer.  ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 36, at 
515. 
SWIFT (FINAL) 12/1/2008  11:43:43 AM 
1420 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1411 
 
to admit statements of then existing state of mind under FRE 803(3) 
is permissible precisely because it does not involve the declarant’s 
perception or memory and does not rely on generalizations about the 
accuracy of those testimonial qualities. 
Professor Rothstein suggests that the timeliness test opinions 
could be justified as holding that any statement of then existing state 
of mind offered to prove the past identical mental state can be ex-
cluded as a statement of memory or belief to prove a past fact.41  This 
is simply wrong.42  The inference backwards to the past state of mind 
does not involve memory or belief.  Treating it as if it did would re-
quire rejecting the backwards continuity theory of relevance in all 
state of mind cases, and there is no hint in the timeliness test opin-
ions that they are doing any such thing. 
D. Conclusions 
There is a cluster of doctrines that courts use to administer the 
proper scope of FRE 803(3).  I have no quarrel with the doctrines, 
just discussed, that exclude criminal defendants’ post-crime state-
ments because of perception and memory dangers that violate the 
express exclusionary term of FRE 803(3).  They are necessary to pre-
vent the seepage of perception and memory risks into the scope of 
that exception.  They should be applied precisely, and it is an impor-
tant role of the academic commentator to hold courts to precision in 
their use of exclusionary doctrines.  If, as Professor Rothstein sug-
gests, courts are using the timeliness test in order to exclude state-
ments that could be “imprecisely” excluded otherwise, we should 
point this out. 
But I do not think that the courts using the timeliness test are 
doing this.  I think they know what they are doing.  They use this test 
to exclude statements of then existing state of mind that do not fall 
within the exclusionary doctrines suggested by Professor Rothstein.  
They use the timeliness test precisely because it can exclude relevant 
 41 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1405. 
 42 Professor Rothstein relies on United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280 (11th 
Cir. 2003), to support this suggestion.  However, Samaniego discusses and applies only 
the traditional doctrine forbidding use of FRE 803(3) to admit an irrelevant state of 
mind (in this case that the declarant said “I’m sorry.”) in order to prove a past exter-
nal event (his theft of Roberto Duran’s championship belts) that triggered it.  The 
doctrine from Professor Rothstein’s Evidence Nutshell quoted above in footnote 36 
thus required exclusion.  Samaniego did not involve the use of a present state of mind 
as relevant to prove the declarant’s identical past state of mind, the circumstance to 
which the timeliness test is applied. 
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and admissible state of mind hearsay statements which these doc-
trines simply do not reach. 
IV. THE TIMELINESS TEST OPINIONS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON 
GROUNDS OF IRRELEVANCE, AS PERMISSIBLE JUDICIAL AMENDMENT OF 
FRE 803(3), OR AS AN APPLICATION OF FRE 403 
So far I have shown that Professor Rothstein’s explanation of the 
timeliness test as an “imprecise” application of two valid exclusionary 
doctrines does not hold.  Now, Professor Rothstein’s further set of 
suggestions must be addressed.  These suggestions also posit reasons 
why defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay could legitimately 
be excluded, again in the hope of justifying its outcomes. 
A. If the Continuity Inference Logically Fails in a Specific Case, the 
State of Mind Statement Can Be Excluded as Irrelevant 
Professor Rothstein’s first suggestion is based on an idea, raised 
in the McCormick treatise, that a present state of mind statement 
could be excluded as irrelevant to prove an identical past state of 
mind.43  The traditional example of such irrelevance is if a lengthy 
passage of time between present statement and past state of mind 
makes the inference of backwards continuity to the past state of mind 
so highly improbable as to be unreasonable.44  Irrelevance is a ques-
tion for the court to decide as a matter of logical relevancy, on the 
specific facts.45  Courts that find irrelevance on this basis decide the 
issue explicitly and do not confuse it with application of the timeli-
ness test.46
 43 Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1407 n.30; see MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 274, at 
267–68 n.8; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, at 604–05. 
 44 “[T]o say that circumstantial evidence is irrelevant . . . is to say that knowing 
the evidence does not justify any reasonable inference as to the fact in question.”  
MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 185, at 735. 
 45 See id. § 274, at 271. 
 46 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1986) (The 
court views the two year time lapse between the end of the alleged criminal scheme 
and the making of the statement under the timeliness test both as “two years to re-
flect upon their actions and potentially an incentive to misrepresent the truth” and 
as raising a “questionable lack of relevance . . . .”); United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 
1224, 1231–32 (6th Cir. 1995) (viewing defendant’s statement made twenty-four 
hours after the triggering event as “not probative” to prove the identical mental state 
twenty-four hours earlier, as well as violating the timeliness test to prove a “mistaken” 
state of mind on the prior day due to lapse of time and knowledge that he was under 
investigation); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 772, 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (Two and 
one-half months between defendant’s last criminal act and making of statement, plus 
likelihood defendant knew his conversation was recorded, violated the timeliness 
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The Mueller and Kirkpatrick treatise also suggests that irrele-
vance could be based on a fact that logically negates the backwards 
inference of continuity of state of mind.  For example, a “triggering 
event” on June 1 could cause the declarant to have a specific state of 
mind.47  If the declarant makes a statement expressing this then exist-
ing state of mind on June 2, it could not be relevant to prove that the 
declarant held the same specific state of mind on any date before 
June 1.  Logically, the declarant could not have held the relevant 
mental state prior to the triggering event that caused it.  No inference 
of continuity of state of mind, backwards to a time prior to that event, 
could be made. 
The McCormick treatise, which Professor Rothstein cites, sug-
gests a different theory of an intervening event.  It posits that if a 
criminal defendant’s post-crime statement of an “innocent” state of 
mind is made after the defendant’s arrest or consultation with coun-
sel, the statement might not be relevant to prove that the same “in-
nocent” state of mind existed earlier, at the time of the alleged 
crime.48  The claim would be that these are intervening events that so 
increase the likelihood that the defendant would fabricate a self-
serving statement that it would no longer be plausible to infer conti-
nuity backwards to that earlier time. 
But this claim is not equivalent to the “logical irrelevance” that is 
based on the lengthy passage of time or the occurrence of the trigger-
ing event in between the present and past mental state.  While events 
like an ongoing police investigation, arrest, charge, and consultation 
with counsel may enhance a defendant’s motive to fabricate, the case 
law holds that a defendant’s motive to fabricate already exists during 
test’s contemporaneity requirement; the court also seems to hold independently that 
the passage of time destroyed the relevance of defendant’s statement.). 
 47 The Muller and Kirkpatrick treatise presents an example of a hearsay state-
ment about a then existing belief about physical state: “I’m allergic to peanuts.”  This 
state of mind is relevant to the question whether or not the declarant would have 
eaten peanuts at a particular time.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, 
at 605.  The treatise asserts that if it could be proved that the declarant was first in-
formed about the allergy a week before making the statement, a backwards inference 
that the declarant held the same state of mind of belief about her physical state a 
month before is not plausible.  See id. 
The case of Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 100 F.3d 203, 212–13 (1st Cir. 
1996) presents another example of exclusion based on an intervening event (angry 
letters written in March excluded to prove same past state of mind in January and 
early February, due to the intervening event of a bitter quarrel and break-up between 
the letter writer and the recipient).  The governing legal standard cited by the Co-
lasanto court is a relevance standard. 
 48 See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 274, at 268 n.8 (“The normal assumption 
that states of mind continue . . . does not hold in this circumstance.”). 
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an ongoing crime or immediately after, and certainly before the de-
fendant has knowledge of any investigation.49  More important, judi-
cial concern about a defendant’s motive to fabricate does not make 
his statement of an “innocent” state of mind irrelevant.  Motive gen-
erates a competing inference of insincerity, but it does not wholly ne-
gate either the possibility of sincerity or that the defendant’s inno-
cent state of mind continues backwards to a time prior to the 
investigation, arrest, and so forth.50
The inference that a person with strong motive to lie can still be 
telling the truth is reasonable.  A party’s admission offered against 
him under FRE 801(d)(2)(A) is often tainted by a powerful self-
serving motive to fabricate.  Such admissions are not rejected as ir-
relevant because it is not impossible or implausible that the party is 
nevertheless telling the truth when making his hearsay statement.51  It 
seems at least equally possible that a criminal defendant is sincere in 
stating the truth about his then existing state of mind.  And if he is 
sincere, then the continuity inference backwards in time to the al-
leged crime remains reasonable. 
B. Courts Can Respond to the Sincerity Dangers in Statements of Then 
Existing State of Mind that Are Admissible Under FRE 803(3) in 
Three Ways, but Only One of These is Legitimate Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence 
The crux of the timeliness test opinions is that courts are con-
cerned about significant sincerity dangers in defendants’ post-crime 
statements of state of mind.  After investigation, arrest, and charge, 
defendants certainly do have the opportunity to misrepresent their 
actual state of mind. It is criminal defendants’ motive and opportu-
nity to make false statements, not dangers of perception and mem-
ory, that haunts the judicial mind and pervades the courts’ opinions. 
 49 See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2000) (state-
ment made by defendant during ongoing crime and without knowledge that he was 
being investigated); United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(statement made one hour after triggering event); United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 
462, 467–68 (7th Cir. 1993) (statement made to office manager four hours after exe-
cuting allegedly fraudulent invoice). 
 50 MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 185, at 735 (“That more than one inference 
could be drawn is not enough to render the evidence irrelevant.”). 
 51 In making such determinations of irrelevancy, “[t]he judge can only ask, could 
a reasonable juror believe that . . . [the statement of then existing innocent state of 
mind] makes it more probable than it would otherwise be that the accused . . . 
[lacked criminal intent at the time] of the crime being tried?”  Id. 
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There are three ways that courts could respond when they per-
ceive a significant sincerity danger in hearsay that has satisfied the 
express terms of  FRE 803(3).  First, they could admit the hearsay 
statement under those express terms, open the credibility question to 
proof and argument by the adversaries, and permit the jury to resolve 
it.  This is the general approach of the FRE.52  Second, courts could 
impose a specific additional doctrinal test on the exception, such as 
the timeliness test, that would permit them to exclude the hearsay 
themselves.  This has the effect of adding a foundational requirement 
that amends the hearsay exception.  Third, courts could exercise dis-
cretion to exclude the problematic hearsay on a case by case basis 
under FRE 403.  I believe that only the first option is legitimate under 
the FRE’s categorical approach to the admission of hearsay. 
1. The First Option: Let the Jury Decide 
Professor Rothstein agrees that the first option is the better one, 
but he describes this position as “personal perceptions.”53  I cannot 
agree that this view is just a matter of perception.  I have stated else-
where the reasons that legitimate the first option both under tradi-
tional hearsay policy54 and under narrative theory.55  I understand 
that courts do adopt the second option, and perhaps even the third, 
but I will briefly sketch again why these two options should not be 
endorsed as legitimate. 
2. The Second Option: Adding a Brightline Requirement  
to FRE 803(3) Cannot Be Justified Without Amending 
the Rule. 
Courts that inject the timeliness test into FRE 803(3) seem to 
have adopted the second option.  They have added a requirement to 
the categorical exception and have applied it as a brightline test. 
They ask, “Has time passed between a triggering event (which they 
assume is the alleged crime) and the declarant’s state of mind state-
ment?”56  If time has passed, then there is time for the defendant to 
 52 See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 270, at 250 (“Under the structure of the Fed-
eral Rules, judgments about credibility [of out-of-court statements] should generally 
be left to the jury rather than preempted by a judicial determination of inadmissibil-
ity.”). 
 53 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1406 n.27. 
 54 See Swift, supra note 25, at 647–55. 
 55 See Swift, supra note 2, at 978, 997–99. 
 56 As I wrote earlier: 
The reported federal cases demonstrate that the “time” between event 
and statement . . . can be whittled down to nothing . . . two years . . . 
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reflect and the opportunity to fabricate exists.  Many timeliness test 
opinions engage in no case specific analysis of the strength or weak-
ness of that motive, even when the statement is made before the 
criminal defendant is investigated, arrested, or charged with a 
crime.57  Courts also assume that this motive will have dominated the 
thinking of the defendant to such an extent that his post-crime 
statement should not even be considered by the jury.58
The crucial question is whether the second option—judicial im-
position of the brightline timeliness test—can be justified under the 
FRE’s categorical approach to the admission of hearsay.  Prior to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the definitions of the 
hearsay exceptions evolved through common law decision making, 
with courts adding and subtracting specific terms as part of this proc-
ess.  Since the adoption of the Rules, it has been held to be unaccept-
able for courts to import common law foundational requirements 
into the Rules when those requirements are not supported by the 
terms of the Rule itself.59
one hour . . . fours hours . . . the very start of three weeks of illegal en-
ticing . . . and in the middle of a business lunch conversation in which 
the defendant may or may not have learned he was speaking to an un-
dercover FBI agent. 
Swift, supra note 25, at 650. 
 57 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 467–68 (7th Cir. 1993)  The court’s 
analysis consisted only of the following:  
Macey claims that his statement shows that he never intended the in-
voice to be fraudulent . . . .  But the statement was made four hours af-
ter the invoice was executed.  The district court could have reasonably 
concluded that Macey had time to fabricate a story in the four hours 
between his fraud and his statement to Kaiser.  Because good reason 
existed for its decision, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
precluding Kaiser's hearsay testimony. 
Id.; United States v. Rivera-Hernandez, 497 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir. 2007)  The court rea-
soned only as follows: 
But evidence in the record confirms that [the defendant’s] statement 
to his father occurred well after his demand . . . for the money.  As 
such, the district court could have reasonably concluded that the 
statement was untrustworthy, and therefore unreliable, because [the 
defendant] had enough time to fabricate and misrepresent his state-
ment. 
Id. 
 59 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 883–88 (1988).  Professor Imwinkelried cites three cases from 
the Supreme Court of the United States in support of his conclusion that “[R]ule 402 
deprives the judiciary of the common-law power to prescribe exclusionary rules of 
evidence, and the legislative history of rule 402 confirms that suggestion.”  Id. at 882. 
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Professor Rothstein posits that I may have overlooked that some 
federal courts continue the common law tradition by insisting upon 
“a judicially imposed requirement for many hearsay exceptions, that 
there be no motive to fabricate.”60  For this position he cites United 
States v. Brown61 and Wigmore’s treatise.62  But the Brown opinion 
does not impose a “no motive to fabricate” requirement on FRE 
803(2), the excited utterance hearsay exception at issue therein, nor 
on any other exception.  Brown’s analysis focuses on whether the ut-
terance was in fact “under stress of excitement” and therefore within 
the express terms of the exception.63
 60 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1406 n.26. 
 61 United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 62 See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1714, at 91 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976).  Professor Rothstein also states that his own cita-
tions of major Evidence treatises support this point, citing his own footnotes 30 and 
26.  Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1408 n.26.  Footnotes 30 and 36, however, concern 
the use of FRE 403 to exclude untrustworthy state of mind hearsay on a case by case 
basis, not a general “no motive” requirement imposed on the state of mind excep-
tion itself.  In fact, commentators agree that there was no general “no motive” re-
quirement enacted into FRE 803(3).  See infra note 66. 
 63 It is well-established that the “stress of excitement” is viewed as disrupting the 
opportunity to fabricate, and does not speak to the existence (or non-existence) of a 
motive to do so.  “The rationale for the exception lies in the special reliability that is 
furnished when excitement suspends the declarant’s powers of reflection and fabri-
cation.”  MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 272, at 255.  Brown does refer to a requirement 
in the Third Circuit that an excited utterance be made “before there has been time 
to reflect and fabricate.”  Brown, 254 F.3d at 458.  This timeliness factor is a consid-
eration in deciding whether the statement was made under the “stress of excite-
ment,” as is required by the express terms of FRE 803(2), as the Brown and other opi-
nions make clear. 
The Brown opinion states as follows: 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) does not require that, in order to be admissible, 
the statement be contemporaneous with the startling event, but rather 
only with the excitement caused by the event.  The critical question in 
the instant case, therefore, is whether the men’s report of an armed 
man likely occurred during the period of excitement engendered by 
their sighting of the gunman [citing cases in which “stress of excite-
ment” was found even after the passage of up to three hours] . . . . Un-
der factual circumstances comparable to those here, where the tempo-
ral gap was only a matter of one or a few minutes, courts have often 
admitted the asserted excited utterance . . . . 
     In the case at bar . . . it was entirely reasonable for the District Court 
to infer from the testimony that only a short time had passed between 
the startling event and the statements, that the declarants were still 
visibly in an excited state, that their statements thus were likely made in 
a state of excitement originating with the event, and consequently that 
their statements were admissible as excited utterances pursuant to Rule 
803(2). 
Brown, 254 F.3d at 460–61. 
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Nor does Wigmore’s treatise support Professor Rothstein’s posi-
tion.  The treatise simply states the fact that, at common law, the 
hearsay exception for statements of physical and mental states in-
cluded a premise that they were made “without any obvious motive to 
misrepresent.”64  While this common law principle is still reflected in 
the California Evidence Code,65 commentators agree that FRE 803(3) 
did not enact a general “no self-serving motive” requirement.66
Appellate courts adopting the timeliness test have based their 
decisions not on express terms in FRE 803(3) itself but on a com-
ment in the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule, which states that 
“Exception (3) is essentially a specialized application of Exception 
(1), presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility.”  
Exception (1), FRE 803(1), is the exception for a declarant’s present 
sense impressions of events happening in the external world.  Its ex-
press terms require contemporaneity between perception of the ex-
ternal event that is the subject of a declarant’s statement and the 
making of the hearsay statement itself.  FRE 803(3)’s express term 
“then existing state of mind” likewise requires contemporaneity be-
tween perception of the internal state of mind that is the subject of a 
declarant’s statement and the making of the hearsay statement it-
 64 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 1714, at 91.  Moreover, the treatise then criticizes 
application of this principle to criminal defendants’ presumed pre-crime or post-
crime motive to misrepresent because the assumption that all defendants do have a 
guilty motive because they really are guilty is unfair.  Id. § 1732, at 156–62. 
 65 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1252 provides for the exclusion of statements of state of 
mind on grounds of lack of trustworthiness.   
 66 See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 270, at 249.  
The rules give no authorization to such [consideration of the self-
serving nature of the statement] and indeed the omission of a re-
quirement found in the original Uniform Rule that the statement must 
not be made “in bad faith” indicates a contrary legislative intent.  
Moreover, in some other exceptions, the self-serving character of a 
statement, appearing in the form of a motive to falsify, is specified as a 
ground for exclusion.   
Id.  
See also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, in 4 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 803.02[4][d], at 803–30 (9th ed. 2006) (It is 
“inappropriate to superimpose a trustworthiness requirement on the provisions of 
Rule 803(3).”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, at 614 (“It is surely 
wrong to apply a per ser rule that would exclude self-serving statements that further 
the interests of the speaker or tend to justify or excuse his conduct.”); MICHAEL 
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803:0, at 61 (6th ed. 2006).  These 
sources have also been thoroughly discussed and quoted in my earlier Article.  See 
Swift, supra note 25, at 645–47. 
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self.67  This interpretation makes Rule 803(3) parallel to Rule 803(1), 
in accord with the Advisory Committee’s Note. 
In adopting the timeliness test, however, courts have taken the 
analogy to FRE 803(1) much further.  They treat the alleged crime as 
if it were an event “perceived” that is the subject of the defendant’s 
statement.  Their analogy to FRE 803(1) then permits them to de-
mand strict contemporaneity between the past crime and the defen-
dant’s statement about his then existing state of mind. 68  This is 
wrong as a matter of fact.  It may not be the past alleged crime that 
triggers the defendant’s then existing state of mind about which he 
speaks.  Rather, some other current event—a conversation, a ques-
tion, another person’s conduct—could trigger a then existing mental 
state which the defendant expresses, thus generating no opportunity 
for reflection and fabrication. 
Even more important, there is a crucial distinction between FRE 
803(1) and FRE 803(3) which undercuts the courts’ analogy.  The 
requirement of contemporaneous perception of an external event 
and the making of a statement about it is founded on the express 
terms of FRE 803(1).  The same is not true for the timeliness test and 
FRE 803(3).  The timeliness test is not a reasonable judicial interpre-
tation of an express term of the Rule; it adds an express term that ex-
pands the Rule’s approach to sincerity danger well beyond the re-
quirement of “then existing” state of mind.  Without an amendment 
to the Rule, this is unacceptable in a system of codified evidence 
law.69  
Whether to inject the timeliness test into FRE 803(3) as a bright-
line requirement is a question that should be subjected to the formal 
mechanism of amending the Federal Rules.70  Were this amendment 
 67 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 274, at 267 (“As with statements of bodily 
condition, the special assurance of reliability for statements of present state of mind 
rests upon their spontaneity and probable sincerity.”).  See also MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:71, at 600, 603 (“To fit the exception, a statement must 
indicate the speaker’s present and existing state of mind . . . .  Problems of memory are 
negligible and problems of perception minimal . . . .”). 
 68 See United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 69 Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hear-
say Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1144143 (contending that the 
judicial gloss on FRE 803(1) that the statement of present sense impression be 
“spontaneous” is “defensible” because it “has some footing in the statutory lan-
guage”). 
 70 Professor Rothstein’s position that it would take an amendment to get rid of 
the timeliness test may be correct as a practical matter because so many courts of ap-
peal have adopted the test.  See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1409.  But on the merits, it 
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proposed, I would oppose it, in particular as it is focused on a particu-
lar sub-class of hearsay declarants and presumes their guilty motive to 
fabricate.  Had this test been incorporated into FRE 803(3) from the 
beginning, its operation in practice would still make it subject to the 
substantive critiques developed in both my Symposium Article and 
prior writing.71  Professor Rothstein is incorrect in stating that my 
substantive opposition to the timeliness test as bad hearsay policy 
would cease had that test been enacted into FRE 803(3).72
3. The Third Option: FRE 403 Should Not Be Used to 
Exclude Admissible Hearsay as Lacking Credibility 
Professor Rothstein suggests that it might be a legitimate use of 
FRE 403 to exclude hearsay on grounds of lack of credibility even 
when it fits within a categorical exception; he also suggests that this 
may be what the timeliness test opinions are doing “in an inarticulate 
way.” 73
There are two problems with these suggestions.  First, the time-
liness test opinions are not applying FRE 403, or its evaluative stan-
dards, to the pertinent state of mind statement.  Rather, as just de-
scribed above, they assume that any time for reflection between the 
alleged crime and the defendant’s statement creates a sincerity dan-
ger that justifies exclusion.  There is no estimation of the effect of this 
danger on the probative value of a particular defendant’s hearsay 
statement in the context of the facts of the particular case, no evalua-
tion of what specific Rule 403 danger the statement triggers, and no 
application of FRE 403’s “substantially outweighs” requirement.  Can 
Professor Rothstein really condone such an “inarticulate” use of this 
Rule?  If unstated and hypothesized reasoning takes the place of sub-
stantive legal analysis, we will have no evidence law. 
Second, Professor Rothstein suggests that if courts were openly 
to apply the terms of FRE 403 to admissible hearsay, it could be 
proper for the judge to consider the trustworthiness and credibility of 
the declarant as a component of probative value.  Thus if, on the par-
ticular facts of the case, a “statement is so self-serving as to be almost 
worthless[,] . . . its reception into evidence would be unduly time 
is incorrect and should be the opposite.  If a brightline timeliness requirement is to 
be injected, it should be by rule amendment. 
 71 See Swift, supra note 2, at 990–99; Swift, supra note 25, at 647–55. 
 72 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1398.  Indeed, the purpose of my Symposium Ar-
ticle was to critique this test on its merits under narrative theory. 
 73 Id. at 1407. 
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consuming and misleading . . . .”74  At the Association of American 
Law Schools panel presentation, I took the position that a FRE 403 
override of the FRE’s categorical approach to the admission of hear-
say would not be appropriate if based on the credibility of the hearsay 
declarant.  Professor Rothstein queried this position at the panel 
presentation and does so again in his Comments, raising several points 
that he suggests could support a FRE 403 override based on decla-
rants’ lack of credibility. 
His first point is that my position assumes that hearsay decla-
rants’ credibility should be treated like witnesses’ credibility under 
FRE 403.75  He is correct.  The “prevailing view” is that “a judge may 
not consider the credibility of the source of evidence [the witness] in 
gauging probative value under rule 403.”76  Professor Rothstein as-
serts that a number of courts do not agree with this view, but the sin-
gle case he cites does not in fact disagree. 77  Even if there were iso-
lated instances of judicial disagreement, the clear majority view 
should define the proper use of FRE 403.78
His second point is that a Rule 403 override is justified because 
jurors have a harder time assessing the credibility of hearsay decla-
rants who do not appear before them, particularly criminal defen-
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 1408. 
 76 Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 886 (citing leading commentators and the 
“overwhelming majority” of case law) (emphasis added).  See also MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 4:12, at 639–40. 
 77 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1409 n.35.  The opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Florida in Drackett Products v. Blue, 152 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1963) held that the plain-
tiff’s testimony about what she would have done had she known then what she knew 
now about the risk of explosion from mixing water with Drano was correctly ex-
cluded. “Conjecture has no place in proceedings of this sort . . . . The law seems well 
established that testimony consisting of guesses, conjecture or speculation—
suppositions without a premise in fact—are clearly inadmissible in the trial of causes 
in the courts of this country.”  Id. at 465.  This is the grounds for the court’s holding, 
not that the testimony was “too self-serving” as Professor Rothstein claims, although 
the court also states, “Moreover, the answer to such a question would be obvious 
from the inception.”  Id. at 465. 
 78 Professor Imwinkelried acknowledges the existence of isolated, and early, fed-
eral opinions that consider impeachment as pertinent to the probative value of tes-
timony.  Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 886.  But the strongly-held majority view re-
mains that a witness’s credibility is for the jury, and it is therefore to be assumed by 
the court in applying Rule 403.  United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329, 332 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (reversing trial court because FRE 403 neither authorizes a judge to “pro-
tect” jury from contradictory testimony nor excludes evidence because a judge “does 
not find it credible”); Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282, 284 (1st Cir. 1979) (weigh-
ing probative value against unfair prejudice under FRE 403 means probative value “if 
the evidence is believed, not the degree the court finds it believable”). 
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dants whose mendacity they have little experience with.79  But these 
fears about jurors challenge the entire structure of categorical excep-
tions.  The FRE adopted categorical exceptions in order to leave the 
evaluation of the credibility of most admissible individual hearsay de-
clarants to jurors,80 knowing full well that jurors do not observe most 
of these declarants.81  Moreover, jurors lack experience with many 
kinds of hearsay sources whose credibility may be more difficult to 
evaluate than criminal defendants’ obvious motive for mendacity.82
Finally, then, the real point of disagreement between Professor 
Rothstein and me seems to be whether, under a system of codified 
evidence hearsay exceptions, using Rule 403’s provision for judicial 
discretion to exclude admissible hearsay for lack of credibility should 
be considered legitimate.  Although such discretion is not his prefer-
ence, he suggests that it may be legitimate.83
4. Would Judicial Discretion to Exclude Admissible Hearsay 
for Lack of Credibility Under FRE 403 Be Legitimate? 
This short Article will address only briefly the legitimacy of judi-
cial exclusion of admissible hearsay because the declarant lacks 
credibility.  There is surprisingly little academic commentary that is 
directly on point.84  However, it is clear that the majority of major 
 79 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1408. 
 80 A few of the FRE exceptions do explicitly permit judicial evaluation of trust-
worthiness in the admission and exclusion of individual hearsay statements.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 803(6), 803(8), 804(b)(3), 807.  But as is well known, the Advisory Commit-
tee rejected the idea of generally allowing judges to admit or exclude hearsay based 
on their evaluation of its credibility “as involving too great a measure of judicial dis-
cretion.”  FED. R. EVID. art. VII advisory committee’s note.  A general use of FRE 403 
to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay would amount to that “great measure” of ju-
dicial discretion. 
 81 Only FRE 801(d)(1) and 803(5) require the hearsay declarant to be subject to 
cross-examination.  Rules 804 and 807 either require or presume the absence of the 
declarant; Rules 803 (apart from 803(5)) and 801(d)(2) are agnostic on the issue. 
 82 See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 270, at 250 (“[T]he credibility issue can be 
readily appreciated by the jury . . . when the reason to question credibility rests upon 
the declarant’s self-serving motivation.”). 
 83 We both agree, I think, that the better policy would be “to preclude judges’ 
discretion to exclude in these cases.”  See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1409. 
 84 A 1984 article by Professor Margaret Berger stated as follows:  
It is considerably less clear whether the Rules also afford the trial judge 
discretion . . . by allowing him to rely on rule 403 to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence on the ground that the rationale underlying the 
hearsay rule has not been satisfied . . . . because the proffered proof is 
so unreliable that its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice” . . . . 
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treatises do not support either the court-imposed timeliness test or 
the general principle that judges can exclude admissible hearsay be-
cause it is self-serving.85  Those that deal most carefully with the topic 
of legitimacy state that judicial discretion to exclude hearsay admissi-
ble under FRE 803(3) for lack of credibility could perhaps reside in 
FRE 403 on a case by case basis, even though the opinions they cite 
are not using that Rule.  Those treatise authors also take great pains 
to insist that such discretion should be cabined.86
Federal case law actually addressing the use of FRE 403 to ex-
clude admissible hearsay for lack of credibility is sparse.  Opinions 
cited by Professor Rothstein87 and the McCormick treatise88 as exam-
Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codi-
fication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 272 (1984).  Professor Berger does not resolve this 
lack of clarity but poses two questions: 
Now that we have had a decade's experience with the hearsay rules, are 
we satisfied with how they are working? Should we make article VIII 
specifically subject to rule 403 . . . or should some of the rules be 
amended to require a trial judge to make a preliminary finding of 
trustworthiness? 
Id. at 272. 
 85 See supra note 66.  Cf. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, § 8:5, at 42–43 
(“Although the judge has broad authority under . . . [FRE] 403 to exclude hearsay on 
account of risks of unfair prejudice . . . and so forth, this power does not justify refus-
ing to accept hearsay that fits an exception simply because the judge thinks a live ac-
count would be better.”).  The exception is JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 5 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE SECOND EDITION: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE 
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS, § 803.05[2][a], at 803–31 (Joseph M. McLaughlin 
ed., 2006) (2d ed. 2008).  The only authorities cited are four appellate opinions that 
all apply the “timeliness” test.  Elsewhere this treatise also suggests that FRE 403 
could be used to exclude hearsay that falls within an exception on grounds of unreli-
ability.  Id. at § 805.06, at 805–09. 
 86 Swift, supra note 25, at 646–47 & nn.108–09. 
 87 Professor Rothstein cites one case, United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).  Defendant offered hearsay state-
ments made by a third party which supposedly exculpated him.  Professor Rothstein 
claims that the appellate court upheld exclusion of these statements “as not credible 
under Rule 403” and that this case should have been “a prime candidate for [my] 
cross-hairs . . . .”  Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1409 n.35.  But this opinion upheld the 
exclusion of the declarant’s hearsay as untrustworthy under FRE 804(b)(3), the ex-
ception for statements against interest.  Under the terms of this Rule, statements of-
fered to exonerate the accused must have “corroborating circumstances [that] 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement . . . .”  The court relied on Rule 
403 only to reject the non-hearsay use of the statements as prior inconsistent state-
ments to impeach. 
 88 MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 270, at 249 n.11 (citing United States v. Soghana-
lian, 777 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).  But Soghanalian is better read as holding that 
the declarant’s [defendant’s] statement was a statement of past fact, not admissible 
as then existing state of mind.  
[The defendant’s] statement to O’Neill regarding Marden’s con-
duct and the transportation of the rocket launchers is clearly a declara-
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ples do not in fact exemplify such use of that Rule.  A few cases dis-
cuss whether FRE 403 can be used to exclude statements that contain 
multiple levels of hearsay, even where each level is admissible, due to 
the overall unreliability, complexity, confusion, and prejudice in-
volved in properly evaluating them.  Two of the decisions exclude a 
multiple hearsay statement on that basis.89  Other decisions warn 
against misusing the FRE 403 balancing test to defeat the presump-
tion that public records which include evaluative findings are pre-
sumptively admissible under FRE 803(8)(C).90
It is hard to know what to make of the fact that there is so little 
case law on this point.  Perhaps parties do not raise the issue of the 
court’s power to exclude admissible hearsay for lack of credibility; 
perhaps this issue seems so obvious to trial judges that they do not 
need to write about it, or they mistakenly assume that the issue is too 
thorny or too sensitive to address in print. 
On the merits, judicial discretion to exclude otherwise admissi-
ble hearsay on grounds of credibility troubles me.  Whether judges 
should have power to override the terms of categorical hearsay excep-
tions depends on the strength of one’s commitment to the policies 
and values that underlie the FRE’s adoption of the categorical system 
of admitting hearsay.  These include preferring the jury to the judge 
as the arbiter of credibility.  Giving judges discretion to decide 
whether a hearsay declarant lacks sufficient credibility raises prob-
tion of [defendant’s] belief concerning some past act by Marden in 
transporting the rocket launchers. . . .  Had the statement been made 
at the time the rocket launchers were discovered at the airport, per-
haps the defense position of a then existing mental conditions [sic] 
would be stronger.   
Soghanalian, 777 F. Supp. at 17.  The court’s reference to Rule 403 is thus unneces-
sary.  And it is actually applied, at least in part, to the testimony of the witness who 
reported defendant’s hearsay statement. 
 89 See Plastipak Packaging, Inc. v. DePasquale, 75 Fed. Appx. 86, 90–93 (3d Cir. 
2003) (based on “the uncertainty as to the basis for the statements, the fact that [one 
declarant] denied ever making these statements, the multiple layers of hearsay in-
volved and the inability of the jury to assess [the key declarant’s] credibility, we con-
clude that this evidence is ‘so unreliable that its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of prejudice and confusion’”); Precision Piping & 
Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613, 620 (4th Cir. 
1991) (exclusion upheld based on question of reliability, confusion and untoward 
prejudice); Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1034–37 (10th Cir. 1989) (exclusion up-
held based on inadmissibility of one level of hearsay).  All of these opinions refer-
ence WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 85, § 805.6, for the proposition that there is in-
creased risk of unreliability in multiple hearsay and that the trial judge has discretion 
under FRE 403 to exclude such statements. 
 90 See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201–02 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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lems: risk of stereotyping,91 rushed and pressured judgments made 
with little time to reflect,92 and inadequate appellate review under the 
abuse of discretion standard.  These are just some of the dangers that 
discretionary exclusion of hearsay on grounds of credibility could 
raise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In any event, resolving the question whether FRE 403 can or 
should be so used is not dispositive of my critique of the timeliness 
test.  It must be remembered that the courts applying this test make 
no pretense of applying Rule 403, and they do not engage in the fact-
intensive, case-specific, multi-factored analysis that this Rule de-
mands.  The timeliness test poses a great challenge to the administra-
tion of a codified system of evidence rules because it is premised on 
judicial ability to re-write those rules, not just to interpret their terms. 
Professor Rothstein seems to be more comfortable with such ju-
dicial amending of the FRE, even though he disagrees with the policy 
of the timeliness test.  Perhaps he thinks that the common law tradi-
tion of judicial control over evidence law is still operative and appro-
priate.  I believe that reasoned critique of the substance of the timeli-
ness test and its outcomes, and its lack of support in the text of FRE 
803(3), shows that this test is “as off-base or out of step with the law”93 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence as I have claimed. 
 91 The timeliness test opinions reflect the judicial presumption that criminal de-
fendants will give in to their motive to fabricate.  Other invidious stereotypes or 
overbroad generalizations could be put into play by judges evaluating the credibility 
of unseen hearsay declarants. 
 92 Careful and sensitive application of FRE 403 in the midst of trial is a daunting 
task.  It requires estimation of the probative value of a criminal defendant’s admissi-
ble hearsay statement not just on credibility grounds, but within the context of the 
entire case.  It may require nuanced evaluation under Old Chief’s concepts of eviden-
tiary richness and narrative integrity.  And it certainly requires more than a reflex re-
sponse to risky hearsay statements as too prejudicial or confusing for the jury.  It is 
for all of these reasons that the Advisory Committee rejected a discretionary ap-
proach to the admission of hearsay in favor of the categorical exceptions. 
 93 See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 1409. 
